missouri v jenkins case brief 1990

To hold otherwise would fail to take account of the obligations of local governments, under the Supremacy Clause, to fulfill the requirements that the Constitution imposes on them. [ 433 trict / distrikt/ n. This does not detract, however, from the fundamental point that the Judiciary is not free to exercise all federal power; it may exercise only the ] The old cases recognized two exceptions to this rule, neither of which is relevant here. ] KCMSD voters approved a levy of $3.75 per $100 in 1969, but efforts to raise the tax rate higher than that had consistently failed to obtain the approval of two-thirds of the voters, and the District Court found it unlikely that a proposal to raise taxes above $3.75 per $100 would receive the voters' approval. Opinion Announcement - June 12, 1995. 210 Id., at 411. The Court's discussion today, and its stated approval of the "method for future funding" found "preferable" by the Court of Appeals, is unnecessary for the decision in this case. App. Many of the goals of the quality education programs have been attained, and there is an interest in having the court hand back over control to the State and local authorities. On remand, however, the District Court held that the State and KCMSD were 75% and 25% at fault, respectively, ordered them to share the cost of the remedy in that proportion, and held them jointly and severally liable. 14. Pp. Const., Art. This reflects the Framers' understanding that taxation was not a proper area for judicial involvement. In fact, the District Court acknowledged in its very first remedial order that the development of a remedy in this case would involve "a choice among a wide range of possibilities." U.S. 33, 39] 433 was explained in Pink, "[a] timely petition for rehearing . U.S. 33, 76] The District Court declined to impose a greater share of the cost on the State, but it accepted that KCMSD had "exhausted all available means of raising additional revenue." . Unlike legislative bodies, which may hold hearings on how best to raise revenues, all subject to the views of constituents to whom the Legislature is accountable, the Judiciary must grope ahead with only the assistance of the parties, or perhaps random amici curiae. . As the State puts it, "[t]he only reason that the court below needed to consider an unprecedented tax increase was the equally unprecedented cost of its remedial programs." However, over the 18-year span of the case, the court ordered remedies that were focused instead on improving educational facilities and programs inside KCMSD.[1]. 70, 98 L.Ed.2d 34 (1987). Some essential litigation history is necessary for a full understanding of what is at stake here and what will be wrought if the implications of all the Court's statements are followed to the full extent. Milliken v. Bradley, supra, at 289-290. Rather, it found only that the taxation orders were necessary to fund the particular remedy it had devised. The case raises two im-portant issues: constitutional federalism concerns of the sort dealt with in the Court's opinion, and broader questions about the prac- In an action under 42 U.S.C. similarly styled petitions by other parties seeking to intervene, and issued its mandate. See 672 F. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 61 (1990) (Jenkins II) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). By the time of the order at issue here, the District Court's remedies included some "$260 million in capital improvements and a magnet-school plan costing over $200 million." 491 To ensure complete funding of the remedy, the court also held the two tortfeasors jointly and severally liable for the cost of the plan. Id., at 70a. The plaintiffs and KCMSD might well be seen as parties that have "joined forces apparently for the purpose of extracting funds from the state treasury." U.S. 816 for Cert. an abstract question. Id., at 121a. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. H. Bartow Farr . The District Court correctly compensated the work of paralegals, law clerks, and recent law graduates at the market rates for their services, rather than at their cost to the attorneys. 113a. 433 It ever has been, and ever will be pursued, until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit." 298 (1937); Conboy v. First National Bank of Jersey City, Media. 377 ] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of New Mexico by Hal Stratton, Attorney General, Randall W. Childress, Deputy Attorney General, Charles R. Peifer, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Paul Farley, Assistant Attorney General; for Jackson County, Missouri, by John B. Williams and Russell D. Jacobson; for the National Governors' Association et al. 400, 408 (WD Mo. And the important effects of the taxation order discussed here raise additional federalism concerns that counsel against the Court's analysis. Benson and the LDF requested attorney's fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. A remedy that uses the quality of education as a lure to attract nonminority students will place the District Court at the center of controversies over educational philosophy that by tradition are left to this Nation's communities. U.S. 33, 77] The State of Missouri and Kansas City students had been involved in an 18-year-long. This direction indicates that the District Court understood that it was now obliged to allow KCMSD to set the tax levy itself. Appeals "did not require the District Court to reverse the tax increase that it had imposed for prior fiscal years," it "required the District Court to use the less obtrusive procedures beginning with the fiscal year commencing after the remand." It found the District Court's pursuit of desegregative attractiveness in formulating a desegregation plan for the city district was beyond the scope of the District Court's remedial authority. The sheer immensity of the programs encompassed by the district court's order - the large number of magnet schools and the quantity of capital renovations and new construction - are concededly without parallel in any other school district in the country." Thank you and the best of luck to you on your LSAT exam. U.S. 33, 59] Language links are at the top of the page across from the title. 88-1150). 19 (1985). CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT. 855 F.2d 1295 (1988). In Jenkins the Court decided that the term "reasonable attorney's fee" in the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act referred to attorney work product, and thereby included work completed by paralegals. That Amendment has no application to an award of attorney's fees, ancillary to a grant of prospective relief, against a State, Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, and it follows that the same is true for the calculation of the amount of the fee. . On October 14, 1988, the Court of Appeals denied this and two 15 See Langnes v. Green, Its end purpose is not only to remedy the violation to the extent practicable, but also to restore control to state and local authorities. True, today's case is not an instance of one branch of the Federal Government invading the province of another. We turn to the tax increase imposed by the District Court. . In this case, the order for salary increases exceeded the courts authority because it created a magnet district which is aninterdistrict solution to anintradistrict problem. Other Circuits routinely treat documents so labeled 99 Michael D. Gordon and Lawrence A. Poltrock filed a brief for respondent American Federation of Teachers, Local 691. to Pet. Missouri argued that these orders went beyond the court's authority. 107 The Eighth Circuit, unlike other Circuits, does not have a published practice of treating all suggestions for rehearing in banc, no matter how styled, as containing both petitions for panel rehearing and suggestions for rehearing in banc. As . The court reasoned that the State should pay for most of the desegregation cost under the principle that "the person See 855 F.2d, at 1318 (Lay, C. J., concurring and dissenting); Brief for Icelean Clark et al. The court again faced the problem of funding, for KCMSD's efforts to persuade the voters to approve a tax increase had failed, as had its efforts to seek funds from the Kansas City Council and the state legislature. The scope of the desegregation order was also upheld against all the State's objections, id., at 1301-1307, as was the allocation of costs, id., at 1307-1308. 1985), aff'd as modified, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. With respect to the would-be intervenors, the Court of Appeals upheld the denial of intervention. 446 Cf. U.S. 816 process by preventing a local government from implementing that remedy. Anything that is predominantly black is not necessarily inferior. U.S. 406 often used to encourage voluntary movement of students within the district in a pattern that aids desegregation. In that year, the KCMSD, the U.S. 33, 34] As the District Court acknowledged, the plaintiffs and the KCMSD pursued a "friendly adversary" relationship. Synopsis of Rule of Law. (1971), but local officials should at least have the opportunity to devise their own solutions to these problems. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. U.S., at 291 You can opt out at any time by clicking the unsubscribe link in our newsletter, Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action (BAMN). 1997). We have approved desegregation orders using assignment changes and some ancillary education programs to ensure the operation of a unitary school system for the district's children. The Constitution does not prevent individuals from choosing to live, work, or go to school together. But the Court of Appeals' entire discussion of "a preferable method for future funding," ibid., can be considered no more than dictum, the court itself having already upheld the District Court's actions to date. The District Court abused its discretion in imposing the tax increase, which contravened the principles of comity. (1881) (distinguishing Meriwether, supra). 86a. 330 It is true that the Eighth Circuit's original October 14 order stated that there were three "petitions for rehearing en banc pending before the Court" and that all "petitions for rehearing en banc" were denied. (1879) (where the statute empowering the corporation to issue bonds contains a limit on the taxing power, federal court has no power of mandamus to compel a levy in excess of that power; "We have no power by mandamus to compel a municipal corporation to levy a tax which the law does not authorize. U.S. 187, 196 Rule App. Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750 (1978), cert. [495 The suggestion that our limited grant of certiorari requires us to decide this case blinkered as to the actual remedy underlying it, ante, at 53, is ill founded. "The judiciary . A reasonable attorney's fee under 1988 is one calculated on the basis of rates and practices prevailing in the relevant market and one that grants the successful civil rights plaintiff a "fully compensatory fee," comparable to what "is traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client." [495 19 (W.D.Mo. . [495 The State funded all of those measures by court order. The District Court certified a plaintiff class of present and future KCMSD students. Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657 (1986) (in banc). U.S. 170 2101(c) --which requires that a civil certiorari petition be filed within 90 days after the entry of the judgment below, and that any application for an extension of time be filed within the original 90-day period -- since, while the filing of a "petition for rehearing" under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 40 tolls the running of the 90-day period, the filing of a "suggestion for rehearing in banc" under Rule 35 does not.